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Abstract
Michael Weisberg and Kenneth Reisman argue that the so-called Vol-
terra Principle can be derived from a series of predator-prey models, and
that, therefore, the Volterra Principle is a prime example for the practice
of robustness analysis. In the present paper, I give new results regarding
the Volterra Principle, extending Weisberg’s and Reisman’s work, and
I discuss the consequences of these new results for robustness analysis.
I argue that we do not end up with multiple, independent models, but
rather with one general model. I identify the kind of situation in which
this generalization approach may occur, I analyze the generalized Volterra
Principle from an explanatory perspective, and I propose that cases in
which the generalization approach may not apply are in fact cases of
mathematical coincidences.
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1 Introduction
The Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model is historically important, because it ini-
tiated mathematical modeling in biology. It is also philosophically important,
because it is a much-discussed case study in the debates on scientific modeling,
explanation, idealization, and robustness analysis. One of the most important
results of the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model is the Volterra Principle. This
principle, first formulated as the “Third Law” by Vito Volterra, is supposed to
explain an empirical regularity about fishery statistics. However, the Lotka-
Volterra predator-prey model is highly idealized, to the point that a realistic
interpretation of the model is questionable. Does this mean that the Volterra
Principle is questionable as well? Michael Weisberg (2006b), and Michael Weis-
berg and Kenneth Reisman (2008) argue that this is not the case. They propose
that the Volterra Principle can also be established from other predator-prey
models. According to Weisberg, the Volterra Principle is thus a prime example
for the practice of robustness analysis.
In the present paper, I present new results concerning the Volterra Principle,
extending and refining Weisberg’s and Reisman’s work, and I discuss the conse-
quences of these new results for robustness analysis. The results are in keeping
with the goals of robustness analysis proposed by Weisberg. However, they
deviate from the process of robustness analysis that Weisberg proposes. In par-
ticular, we do not end up with multiple independent models, but rather with one
general model. I identify the situations in which this generalization approach
may apply. I analyze the generalized Volterra Principle from an explanatory
perspective, and I show that my results exhibit several virtues of mathematical
explanations. Finally, I discuss cases where the generalization approach may not
apply, and I propose that these are in fact cases of mathematical coincidences.
2 The Lotka-Volterra Predator-Prey Model
The Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model was originally proposed by Alfred Lotka
and Vito Volterra.1 Formally, the model is a set of two coupled ordinary dif-
ferential equations. These equations are intended to capture the interactions
between a population of prey animals, and a population of predators, which
feed on the prey.2 The model can be written as follows:
1See Knuuttila and Loettgers (2016) for a discussion of the contrast between Lotka’s and
Volterra’s approach to scientific modeling in general, and to their eponymous model in par-
ticular.
2Kot (2001) gives a detailed and accessible introduction to the mathematical aspects of
the Lotka-Volterra model, and predator-prey models in general.
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x˙ = rx− axy (1)
y˙ = bxy −my (2)
Here, x is shorthand for x(t), the size of the prey population at time t; y is
shorthand for y(t), the size of the predator population at time t; x˙ and y˙ are the
respective time derivatives. According to equation (1), the prey population x
grows at a constant positive rate r in the absence of predators; in the presence
of predators, the number of prey decreases proportionally to the number of
predators, at a constant positive rate a. According to equation (2), the predator
population y decreases at a constant positive rate m in the absence of prey;
in the presence of prey, the predator population grows proportionally to the
number of prey available, at a constant positive rate b. The system is coupled
because both equations depend on both x and y. Dynamically, this system
exhibits undampened oscillations: if undisturbed, it will oscillate indefinitely on
the same circular orbit in phase space; see figure 1 for an illustration.
Figure 1: Periodic orbits in phase space. N1 denotes the prey population; N2
denotes the predator population. The orbits X, Ψ, Λ, Φ are examples of the
exhaustive and disjunct orbits corresponding to systems with different initial
conditions. Ω is the equilibrium state of all systems. If a system is not disturbed,
it evolves on its orbit, running counter-clockwise with a constant period, and
it stays on its orbit; this is Volterra’s “First Law”. Illustration from Volterra
(1928, p. 14)
Volterra’s motivation for formulating the predator-prey model was an em-
pirical phenomenon in need of explanation.3 The explanandum concerns fishery
3See Volterra (1928) for Volterra’s own account of the story.
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statistics. During WW1, when fishing in the Adriatic was diminished, fishery
statistics showed that the ratio between predators and prey fish shifted in favor
of predators. After the war, when fishing returned to its pre-war intensity, the
ratio shifted back, and favored the prey. This prompted the question as to why
this shift in proportions occurred. The explanation is provided by Volterra’s
“Third Law”, now called the Volterra Principle. The Volterra Principle states
that, if we continuously remove a constant proportion of both the predator and
prey populations, then the average number of predators will decrease relative
to the average number of prey; see figure 2 for an illustration. Volterra showed
that this shift of averages can be derived from the predator-prey model. He
thus provided a how-possibly explanation of the statistical phenomenon: the
regularity holds in a very simple model of population dynamics.4
It has, however, been disputed that the Volterra Principle provides an actual
explanation. Many mathematical population biologists today do not believe that
the Lotka-Volterra model is a realistic model of predator-prey interactions. The
main mathematical problem with the model is that it is not structurally stable:
if perturbations terms are added to the model equations, the model’s qualitative
behavior changes.5 Does this mean that the Volterra Principle is also doomed to
fail? This question has been brought to philosophers’ attention in two papers:
Michael Weisberg (2006b), and Michael Weisberg and Kenneth Reisman (2008).
Weisberg and Reisman argue that the Volterra principle does not depend on the
specifics of the original predator-prey model. Rather, the Volterra Principle can
be derived from a variety of models, which are more realistic than the original
predator-prey model. In short, Weisberg and Reisman claim that the Volterra
Principle is a “robust theorem”. This makes the Volterra Principle a prime
example for the practice of robustness analysis. In the next section, I give a
brief introduction to robustness analysis, as well as to Weisberg and Reisman’s
account of the Volterra Principle.
3 Robustness Analysis
3.1 Early Contributions
Robustness analysis was first discussed as a scientific practice in a seminal paper
by Richard Levins (1966).6 Levins observes that population biology makes use
of highly idealized models, i.e., the models are based on assumptions that are,
strictly speaking, false with respect to their target systems. How can we make
sure, nonetheless, that results we derive from such models are still true with
respect to their target systems, and not mere artifacts of the idealizations of the
models? Levins recommends robustness analysis as a remedy. The idea is to
derive results from “several alternative models each with different simplifications
4See, e.g., Forber (2010); Scholl and Räz (2013) on the notion of how-possibly explanations.
5See Brauer and Castillo-Chávez (2001, p. 180) for more on the notion of structural
stability.
6See Weisberg (2006a) for an appraisal of Levins’ paper.
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Figure 2: The population density of the predator-prey system with orbit Λ is
at the equilibrium point Ω on average; this is Volterra’s “Second Law”. If the
equations (1)-(2) of the system at point P are changed, such that the predator
death rate m increases and the prey birth rate r decreases, the system evolves
on the new orbit Λ′ with the equilibrium point Ω′. On average, system Λ′ has
a higher prey density (K1 to K ′1), and a lower predator density (K2 to K ′2).
This is Volterra’s “Third Law”. Before and after WW1, the system was on
orbit Λ′; during WW1, with greatly reduced fishing, the system was on orbit Λ.
Illustration from Volterra (1928, p. 19).
but with a common biological assumption” (Levins, 1966, p. 423). If this pro-
cedure is carried out successfully, the results are called “robust theorems”. The
slogan of robustness analysis is that “our truth is the intersection of independent
lies” (Ibid.).
An early adopter of robustness analysis is William C. Wimsatt (2012b)
[1981].7 Wimsatt advocates a wide conception of robustness analysis, also
dubbed “multiple determination”, whereby the practice is not restricted to the
derivation of phenomena from different models, but rather encompasses, say, the
detection of phenomena using different senses, or different experimental meth-
ods. Wimsatt emphasizes that it is important to determine the limitations of
robustness results, given that robustness analysis involves, in part, understand-
7See also Wimsatt (2007).
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ing the scope and limitations of the robustness of a phenomenon.
An important critique of Levins’s proposal has been formulated by Steven
Hecht Orzack and Elliott Sober (1993). Orzack and Sober point out that ro-
bustness analysis cannot play a confirmatory role. If all the models used in
robustness analysis are idealized, then we do not know whether results derived
from these models are true with respect to the target system. If we want to be
certain, we would have to make sure that at least one of the models faithfully
represents the target system. However, this is usually not the case. In short,
independent lies are still lies. In reaction to Orzack’s and Sober’s objection,
Levins (1993) argues that he did not intend robustness analysis to provide non-
empirical confirmation; rather, robustness analysis is merely supposed to help
in determining the scope and limits of a result.
3.2 Weisberg and Reisman
The most influential recent account of robustness analysis has been proposed
by Michael Weisberg (2006b).8 Weisberg aims to reconcile robustness analysis
with the objections raised by Orzack and Sober. He proposes that robustness
analysis does not confer full-blown confirmation, but rather “low-level confirma-
tion”, that is, “confirmation of the fact that certain mathematical structures can
adequately represent properties of target phenomena” (Ibid., p. 740). Weisberg
characterizes robustness analysis as a four-step process. In the first step, one
examines whether several distinct models share a property that is expected to
be robust. In the second step, one tries to identify the “core structure” that
is responsible for the robust property. The third step consists of an empirical
interpretation of the mathematical structure. The fourth step consists of “sta-
bility analysis”, with the purpose of finding out how sensitive the models are,
with respect to slight changes to their structure.
Weisberg uses the Volterra Principle as a case study to support his analysis.
He argues that the Volterra Principle is robust, given that it can be obtained in
different predator-prey models.9 Specifically, Weisberg claims, we can modify
the structure of the original predator-prey model by adding density dependence
and predator satiation, and still obtain the Volterra Principle; see appendix
A for a brief discussion of these models. Weisberg claims that the Volterra
Principle can be shown to be valid for both of these models. Establishing that
these two models satisfy the Volterra Principle corresponds to the first step of
robustness analysis. Weisberg then argues that these models have a common
structure: the growth rate of predators is mostly controlled by the growth rate
of prey, and the growth rate of prey is mostly controlled by the death rate of
predators. According to Weisberg, this common structure is responsible for the
phenomenon that predators and prey are affected differently by continuous de-
8The interest in Levins’s paper, and robustness analysis, was renewed by Weisberg and
Jay Odenbaugh (2006). These papers initialized the “second wave” of robustness analysis. See
Wimsatt (2012a) for a useful account of the development of robustness analysis.
9Weisberg’s ideas are based on suggestive remarks in Roughgarden (1979), a textbook in
population ecology.
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struction of both species. The identification of the common structure concludes
step two of robustness analysis.
Michael Weisberg and Kenneth Reisman (2008) push robustness analysis
further, and they refine the results regarding the Volterra Principle. First, they
distinguish three kinds of robustness. Parameter robustness investigates ro-
bustness with respect to a variation of parameters in a model. For example,
the Volterra Principle is robust under variations of the parameters a, b, r, and
m in the model (1)-(2). Structural robustness encompasses the more general
robustness across models with different (causal) structure, e.g., models with or
without density dependence.10 Representational robustness encompasses models
that are formulated in different frameworks, e.g., using continuous vs. discrete
variables. Weisberg and Reisman then argue that the Volterra Principle is ro-
bust according to all three kinds of robustness. They provide a formulation of
the Volterra Principle that modifies the “hypothesis” from Weisberg (2006b).
The new formulation is based on the notions of negative coupling and biocide.
A predator-prey system is negatively coupled “just in case increasing the abun-
dance of predators decreases the abundance of prey and increasing the abun-
dance of prey increases the abundance of predators” (Weisberg and Reisman,
2008, p. 114). In a general biocide, the death rate of predators is increased and
the birth rate of the prey is decreased.11 The new formulation of the Volterra
Principle reads as follows:
(VP) Ceteris paribus, if a two-species, predator-prey system is negatively cou-
pled, then a general biocide will increase the abundance of the prey and
decrease the abundance of predators. (Ibid., italics in original.)
Weisberg and Reisman claim that this principle holds in general. However,
they do not provide a conclusive answer as to the scope and limits of (VP).
Weisberg and Reisman also analyze further models with respect to the Volterra
Principle. In Weisberg (2006b), robustness analysis was restricted to parameter
and structural robustness – the models are all formulated in the framework of
coupled ordinary differential equations – while Weisberg and Reisman (2008)
also includes an analysis of individual-based models (IBM). These are finite
models with discrete space and time, and representations of individual animals.
In IBM, the discrete transition rules are not deterministic, but rather stochastic.
The behavior of these models is investigated via simulations. Weisberg and
Reisman argue that the Volterra Principle can be recovered in this framework,
and they therefore conclude that the Volterra Principle is representationally
robust.
10Structural robustness is not to be confused with structural stability, a mathematical no-
tion.
11In the case of system (1)-(2), r is decreased and m is increased. The notion is made
precise in definition 1, see section 4.1 below.
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3.3 After Weisberg and Reisman
The work by Weisberg and Reisman has renewed philosophers’ interest in ro-
bustness analysis. Weisberg’s account of robustness analysis, and the notion
of low-level confirmation, have received considerable attention. Brett Calcott
(2011) points out that a robust theorem is only as good as the set of models
from which it has been derived, and that this is not sufficient for confirmation.
However, robustness can nevertheless be helpful by “narrowing down the pos-
sibility space of candidate solutions” (Calcott, 2011). Wybo Houkes and Krist
Vaesen (2012) provide an in-depth analysis of Weisberg’s work. The main lesson
of their paper is that the evaluative role of robustness analysis concerning a set
of models is only as good as the credibility of the model family from which the
set of models is chosen. The idea of robustness analysis has been applied to
pure mathematics: Ralf Krömer (2012) discusses a potential role for robustness
in the foundations of mathematics, and; David Corfield (2010) focuses on math-
ematical structures exhibiting a surprising “confluence” of structural properties.
The idea of robustness analysis has also been applied to cases from biology in
Knuuttila and Loettgers (2011), and to economics in Kuorikoski et al. (2010).
Robustness analysis is also relevant to the issue of scientific and mathe-
matical explanation. The idea that robustness analysis can enhance our under-
standing of a phenomenon was proposed early in the literature, e.g. by Wimsatt
(2012b). However, the relevance of robustness analysis for explanation has not
been systematically explored. A notable exception is a recent contribution by
Jonah Schupbach (2016). Schupbach proposes that robustness analysis can be
interpreted as an explanatory enterprise. The idea is that if we establish the
robustness of a property, then we can rule out competing explanations of that
property. Schupbach illustrates the idea with the Volterra Principle. Initially,
we should not be confident that the Volterra Principle is generally valid, be-
cause we have only derived it from the original predator-prey model, and the
result could be due to the idealizations of this simple model. However, if we
can establish the Volterra Principle for models with different idealizations, then,
according to Schupbach, we can rule out certain competing explanations as to
why the Volterra Principle holds, namely explanations attributing this fact to
idealizations that are not present in the new models.
3.4 Robustness Analysis and Mathematics
In the present paper, I restrict my attention to one particular kind of robustness,
namely the case of robust theorems that are derived from multiple, independent
models. This is a special case of robustness, in comparison to the wider notion of
robustness championed, for example, by Wimsatt.12 The focus of the discussion
will be on the role of mathematics in robustness analysis. While it has been
acknowledged in the philosophical discussion that mathematics has an important
role to play in robustness analysis, a systematic exploration of this role is so far
missing from the discussion. I will strive to fill this lacuna here. I will argue
12See Calcott (2011) for a similar, useful distinction between several kinds of robustness.
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that mathematics can help us enhance our confidence in a robust result by
showing that it does not depend on particular idealizations. However, this is not
achieved by deriving the result from multiple, independent models, but rather by
deriving the result from one, general model. I will not argue that mathematics,
or robustness analysis, can play a confirmatory role. My discussion of robustness
analysis is based on scientific practice: in the next section, I will present new
results concerning the Volterra Principle.
4 The Volterra Principle Generalized
4.1 The Volterra Principle in a Gause-type Model
In the present section, I generalize the results in Weisberg (2006b) regarding the
Volterra Principle. More specifically, I prove that the Volterra Principle holds
for a more general type of model, which was first proposed by G. F. Gause
(1934). I use the following modification13 of a Gause-type model:
x˙ = xrf(x)− p(x)y (3)
y˙ = p(x)y −my (4)
x is prey abundance, y is predator abundance, r is the constant part of
the prey growth rate, m is predator mortality. The prey growth rate function
f(x), which was missing in the original predator-prey model, is assumed to be
differentiable for x ≥ 0; additionally, it is assumed that dfdx =: fx ≤ 0 and
f(0) = a > 0. The environment can have a carrying capacity, i.e., a constant
K > 0 with f(K) = 0. The functional response p(x), which was assumed to
be the identity function in the original predator-prey model, is assumed to be
differentiable for x ≥ 0; additionally, it is assumed that dpdx =: px > 0 and
p(0) = 0.14
The Volterra Principle states how the equilibrium of a dynamical system
is affected by a change in the parameters of the system; see figure 2 above.
In order for this to be biologically meaningful, the system (3) - (4) needs to
have an equilibrium inside the first quadrant, i.e., an equilibrium with positive
population variables. For the existence of such an equilibrium, we have to
assume that there is an x∗ such that p(x∗) = m. For the formulation of the
Volterra Principle, we additionally assume the existence of an x′ with p(x′) =
m+ δ for a given δ > 0. x∗ and x′ are unique, because p(x) is increasing. If the
system has a carrying capacity K, we have to assume that x∗, x′ < K for the
existence of an equilibrium.
The coordinates of the equilibrium in the first quadrant can be determined
as follows: We set equations (3) and (4) equal to 0 and solve the resulting
13See Freedman (1980, Ch. 4). In comparison to system (4.2), p. 66 of (Freedman, 1980),
I use rf(x) instead of g(x) in equation (3), and p(x) instead of cp(x) in equation (4).
14The numerical response, p(x) in (4), is set equal to the functional response, p(x) in (3).
See Freedman (1980, Ch. 4) for a further discussion of the significance of these assumptions.
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equations. Using the assumption that there is a unique x∗ with p(x∗) = m, we
can deduce that the unique equilibrium has the following coordinates:
(x∗,
x∗rf(x∗)
p(x∗)
) (5)
The change in parameters, which leads to a change in equilibrium, can be
interpreted as an intervention. The following definition makes this precise:
Definition 1. A Volterra Intervention in a predator-prey system is a decrease
of r by an amount , with 0 <  < r, and an increase of m by an amount δ > 0.
The assumption that 0 <  < r avoids a negative growth rate. 0 < δ yields a
new, unique equilibrium in the positive quadrant after the Volterra Intervention.
If we apply a Volterra Intervention to equilibrium (5), and use p(x′) = m + δ,
we get a unique equilibrium with the following coordinates:
(x′,
x′(r − )f(x′)
p(x′)
) (6)
We are interested in the relation between the equilibrium (5) and the equi-
librium (6); more specifically, how a Volterra Intervention affects the relative
abundance of the populations:
Definition 2. A predator-prey system has the Volterra Property if a Volterra
Intervention, applied to an equilibrium (x∗, y∗), yields an equilibrium (x′, y′)
such that the equilibrium abundance of predators relative to prey, i.e., their
ratio, decreases: y
∗
x∗ >
y′
x′
If we examine figure 2, we see that the original Lotka-Volterra model has
the Volterra Property: K2K1 >
K′2
K′1
is true because K2 > K ′2 and K1 < K ′1. We
are now in the position to formulate the following:
Theorem 1. For Gause-type models (3) - (4), the Volterra Property holds true.
Proof. We have to show that the Volterra Property holds true for the system
(3) - (4), i.e, the ratio y∗/x∗ from equilibrium (5) is bigger than the ratio y′/x′
from equilibrium (6):
rf(x∗)
p(x∗)
>
(r − )f(x′)
p(x′)
(7)
This inequality can be rearranged to yield
f(x∗)
f(x′)
p(x′)
p(x∗)
> 1− 
r
(8)
Because p(x∗) = m, p(x′) = m + δ and because p is strictly increasing, we
know that x′ > x∗, i.e., x′ = x∗ + κ for some κ > 0. Replacing x′ with x∗ + κ,
we see that (8) is equivalent to
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f(x∗)
f(x∗ + κ)
p(x∗ + κ)
p(x∗)
> 1− 
r
(9)
The fact that f is a decreasing function implies that f(x∗)/f(x∗+κ) ≥ 1, and
the fact that p is a strictly increasing function implies that p(x∗+κ)/p(x∗) > 1.
This implies that the LHS of the inequality is bigger than 1. The RHS, on the
other hand, is smaller than 1 for  > 0. Therefore, the inequality holds true.
4.2 Stable Equilibria
Theorem 1 is a statement about how the equilibrium of a system changes under
a Volterra Intervention. However, this is not sufficient for the result to be
biologically meaningful. The existence of an equilibrium does not guarantee
that the average abundance of a system coincides with the equilibrium. In the
case of the original Lotka-Volterra model, this was guaranteed by Volterra’s
“Second Law”; see figure 2 above. However, other predator-prey models show a
variety of qualitatively different behaviors. For example, the so-called Samuelson
model15 has an equilibrium that is stable or unstable depending on the choice of
parameters. For some choices, the system spirals towards a stable equilibrium in
the first quadrant. For other choices, the system spirals away from an unstable
equilibrium. In the latter case, it is not relevant whether or not the Volterra
Principle holds true, because the equilibrium point is not where the system is
usually, or on average. Rather, the system will show more and more violent
fluctuations, such that the equilibrium shift predicted by the Volterra Principle
is irrelevant. The same problem also occurs in models with limit cycles. For
example, the model with predator satiation examined in Weisberg (2006b, p.
736) satisfies the Volterra Princile according to Theorem 1. However, the system
does not converge towards an equilibrium, because the model exhibits limit
cycles, and it is not clear how average abundance and equilibrium are related –
an additional result analogous to Volterra’s “Second Law” would be necessary
to establish such a relation.
One way of making sure that the equilibrium is biologically relevant is to
require that it is stable.16 Stability questions are standard in mathematical
population ecology, and Theorem 1 can be combined with an available stability
criterion. An eigenvalue analysis of generalized Gause systems yields a crite-
rion for the equilibrium’s stability.17 This criterion implies that the relevant
equilibrium of the system (3) - (4) is stable under the following condition18:
H(x∗) = x∗fx(x∗) + f(x∗)− x
∗f(x∗)px(x∗)
p(x∗)
< 0 (10)
15See Freedman (1980, pp. 37) for a discussion of this model.
16The relevant notion here is asymptotic stability, which means that systems close to equi-
librium will eventually converge to that equilibrium. This is not to be confused with structural
stability mentioned above. See Freedman (1980); Kot (2001) for more on asymptotic stability.
17See Freedman (1980, p. 72, condition (4.23)).
18fx(x∗), px(x∗) is the derivative of f, p with respect to x, evaluated at x∗.
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This condition can be combined with Theorem 1 as follows: If the equilibrium
of the system (3) - (4), before and after the Volterra Intervention, is stable
according to condition (10), then Theorem 1 is certainly biologically meaningful.
4.3 The Limits of the Volterra Principle
An important advantage of Theorem 1 is that condition (9) allows us to infer
the limits of the Volterra Principle. In particular, condition (9) shows how the
proof of the theorem depends on the assumptions about functions f and p, and
it also shows that these assumptions are minimal, in that if they are weakened
further, the theorem does not hold. Here I will discuss two ways in which the
Volterra Principle does not hold if the assumptions on f and p are weakened.
Possibility 1: Assume that fx > px > 0 in a range x ∈ [x∗, x∗ + κ], i.e., f
is no longer decreasing, but increasing faster than p. This implies that the LHS
of (9) gets smaller than 1 and the inequality is violated for sufficiently small .
Possibility 2: Assume that px < 0, i.e., the functional response decreases.
In this case, we have to be more careful, because the theorem depends on px > 0
in several places. First, we used that px > 0 implies the uniqueness of the
equilibrium. If px < 0, there could be two equilibria, or none. Second, we used
px > 0 to infer x′ > x∗. If px < 0, this relation is inverted; this leads to a
modification of condition (9):
f(x∗)
f(x∗ − κ)
p(x∗ − κ)
p(x∗)
> 1− 
r
(9’)
If we assume that p does not change sign, we need fx > |px| > 0 in the range
x ∈ [x∗ − κ, x∗] in order to violate inequality (9’), i.e., f has to increase faster
than p is decreasing.19
Are the conditions, under which the Volterra Principle is violated, biolog-
ically realistic? Consider, first, possibility 1. fx > 0 is not realistic globally,
because it implies unbounded growth of prey in the absence of predators. How-
ever, fx > 0 seems reasonable in a limited range, in particular when the prey
population is small and growth is not restricted externally. Turning to possibil-
ity 2, the case of a decreasing functional response p has been discussed in the
literature; see, e.g., Kot (2001, pp. 140). According to Kot, so-called “type IV”
functional responses can occur due to prey interference or prey toxicity. Thus,
both possibilities potentially occur in situations that are biologically realistic.
It could be asked whether the assumptions of Theorem 1, on the one hand,
and the requirement of stable equilibria, on the other, are independent. Does the
theorem exclude unstable equilibria, or can we find predator-prey models that
violate the Volterra Principle and have stable equilibria at the same time? In
19If we use a function q(x) instead of p(x) in the predator equation (4) in the model, there
are more possibilities for violating the Volterra Principle – a decreasing q, combined with
increasing p and decreasing f , yields a violation of the Volterra Principle. However, it is
unclear how realistic it is to assume that the functions p and q show a qualitatively different
behavior.
12
order to answer this question, it is useful to reformulate the stability condition
(10). If we assume that f(x∗) is not 0, (10) is equivalent to
fx(x
∗)
f(x∗)
− px(x
∗)
p(x∗)
< − 1
x∗
(11)
The expression on the LHS contains statements about the relative change in
f and p. The question now is whether there are cases in which condition (11)
holds true, while condition (9) is violated. Consider possibility 1 of violating (9),
viz. fx > px > 0. This is compatible with stability (11) if f(x∗) is sufficiently
big, while p(x∗) is sufficiently small. Turning to possibility 2, viz. fx > |px| > 0,
and px < 0, we see that we cannot get stability, because the LHS of (11) will be
positive, unless we admit negative functional responses. This shows that there
are models with stable equilibria that violate the Volterra Principle, notably
models that violate the Volterra Principle according to possibility 1.
4.4 Further Generalizations
Can the above results be generalized further? Theorem 1 depends on the scope
of system (3) - (4). This type of model is dubbed “intermediate” in Freedman
(1980). There is a lot of space for generalization between Gause-type models
and fully general dynamical systems.20 Here I want to mention a different kind
of intermediate model that is important in population ecology. The system (3) -
(4) has so-called “laissez-faire” dynamics, i.e., the functional response (which is
also the numerical response) p(x) does not depend on the predator abundance
y. Some population ecologists believe that this is problematic, because these
models do not allow for non-trivial predator interference.21 To overcome the
problems of “laissez-faire” dynamics, Roger Arditi and Lev Ginzburg (1989)
have proposed so-called ratio-dependent predator-prey models, in which the
functional and numerical responses are functions of the ratio between predator
and prey abundances. Ratio-dependent models have been hotly debated in
population ecology in recent decades.22 It would be interesting to see whether
the Volterra Principle can be extended to this type of model as well.
5 Weisberg’s Volterra Principle Revisited
In this section, I discuss the ramifications of the results in section 4 for Weis-
berg and Reisman’s work on the Volterra Principle, as far as the scientific and
20A general approach to predator-prey models is via so-called Kolmogorov-type models;
see, e.g., Freedman (1980, Ch. 5). This approach was first proposed by Andrey Kolmogorov
(1978) [1936]. Kolmogorov-type models take general dynamical systems of two variables as a
starting point and impose certain restrictions on these systems in order to obtain predator-prey
relationships.
21See Peter Yodzis (1994) for a discussion of the notion of “laissez-faire” dynamics, and
reasons for taking predator interference into account.
22See Arditi and Ginzburg (2012) for a book-length discussion, and Barraquand (2014) for
a critical evaluation, of ratio-dependent models.
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mathematical substance of their contribution is concerned. First, the fact that
the Volterra Principle holds for models with density dependence and predator
satiation, which was pointed out by Weisberg, is implied by Theorem 1: one
merely has to observe that these models are special cases of (3) - (4); see ap-
pendix A. What is more, Theorem 1 not only shows that these two models
satisfy the Volterra Principle, but also shows that this is due to the properties
of the form of the growth function f , and of the functional and the numerical
response p. I will turn to the ramifications of these observations for robustness
analysis below.
Second, the analysis of the scope of Theorem 1, provided in section 4.3,
shows that (VP), the formulation of the Volterra Principle in Weisberg and
Reisman (2008), is incorrect. This is particularly clear if we consider possibility
1, according to which a violation of the Volterra Principle can occur if the growth
function f is increasing. However, f is independent of negative coupling, which
only concerns the interaction terms. Therefore, the Volterra Principle can be
violated if there is negative coupling, and (VP) is wrong.
Third, the equilibrium of a predator-prey system need not necessarily be the
(average) abundance of that system, as I noted in section 4.2 above. Weisberg
and Reisman do not explicitly address this problem. I already pointed out
that Weisberg (2006b, p. 736) proposes extending the Volterra principle to a
model with predator satiation; see appendix A. This model satisfies the Volterra
Principle, according to Theorem 1. However, the model exhibits limit cycles.
An argument analogous to Volterra’s “Second Law” would be necessary to show
that the equilibrium of this system is relevant to the average abundance; without
such an argument, the Volterra Principle may be irrelevant. There is no such
argument in Weisberg (2006b). To be fair, Weisberg and Reisman (2008, p.
119) implicitly acknowledge that the stability of equilibria is relevant to the
Volterra Principle. They compare the significance of equilibria, in the case of
the original Lotka-Volterra predator prey model, one the one hand, and in the
case of the model with density dependent prey, on the other, and note that in
the former case, the equilibrium is the average abundance, while in the latter
case, the system will actually converge towards the equilibrium. They seem to
endorse the system being at equilibrium (at least on average) as a necessary
condition for the Volterra Principle’s being biologically meaningful.
6 Robustness Analysis and Generalization
What is the upshot of the results in section 4 for robustness analysis, and Weis-
berg’s (2006b) account in particular? Weisberg proposes that robustness anal-
ysis proceeds in four steps; see section 3. The results in section 4 are purely
mathematical, and they are thus located within the first two steps of Weisberg’s
account. However, the results in section 4 deviate from Weisberg’s recipe in the
second step. I did not explore the common structure of the different models;
instead, I introduced one general model, the Gause-type model, which encom-
passes all the different models from Weisberg (2006b). I then showed that the
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Gause-type model has the Volterra Property. This generalization shows that the
models investigated by Weisberg are not really independent, but rather belong
to the same type, and that they all satisfy the Volterra Principle, because they
are of this type.
Weisberg anticipates that something along these lines is a possible outcome
of robustness analysis. In the description of the second step, he writes:
In straightforward cases, the common structure is literally the
same mathematical structure in each model. In such cases one can
isolate the common structure and, using mathematical analysis, ver-
ify the fact that the common structure gives rise to the robust prop-
erty. However, such a procedure is not always possible because mod-
els may be developed in different mathematical frameworks or may
represent a similar causal structure in different ways or at different
levels of abstraction. Such cases are much harder to describe in gen-
eral, relying as they do on the theorist’s ability to judge relevantly
similar structures. (Weisberg, 2006b, p. 738)
The generalization approach pursued in section 4 is such a “straightforward
case”. The Volterra Principle turned out to be an actual theorem for the Gause-
type model. I agree with Weisberg that such an outcome should not be expected
in all cases. However, there are systematic differences between cases in which
we can expect to obtain a mathematical theorem, as opposed to cases where no
theorems are forthcoming. I will now identify some of these differences.
The generalization approach will usually not work if models are from dif-
ferent mathematical frameworks, as Weisberg notes. The results in section 4
concern models that are ordinary differential equations. Their robustness is
thus restricted to this particular mathematical framework, and does not ex-
tend to, say, individual-based models, as explored in Weisberg and Reisman
(2008). Put differently, the generalization approach does not work in the case of
representational robustness, i.e., when models belong to different mathematical
frameworks. The reason for this is that models belonging to different frame-
works usually do not share a common mathematical structure, and it is hard, if
not impossible, to treat them in a formally unified manner. The generalization
approach is usually restricted to cases of structural robustness, i.e., robustness
for models from the same mathematical framework.
It is not sufficient, however, that the models are formulated within the same
mathematical framework for the generalization approach to be applicable. It
can be impossible to find a common generalization of models, even if they are
formulated in the same mathematical framework. For example, Vito Volterra
(1978) [1927] explores properties of population fluctuations; the third property,
the “disturbance of averages”, is the Volterra Property. In Part Two, §5, Volterra
generalizes the Volterra Principle to systems with n species. Volterra notes that,
in order for this to make sense, one has to restrict n-species models in several
ways. For example, if one wants to be able to compare the abundances of preda-
tors and prey, one needs an absolute distinction between predators and prey.
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Cases where one species is preyed upon by a second species, whilst also itself
being the predator of a third species, have to be excluded, because it is not
clear how the Volterra Principle should even be formulated in such cases. How-
ever, Volterra shows that, under certain technical assumptions, a generalized
analogue of the Volterra Principle can be proven if the system contains an equal
number of predator and prey species. This draws attention to an important
aspect of the generalization approach: the precise formulation of the property
that is expected to be robust is important. In the cases examined by Volterra,
the robust property is not the same for two species and for n-species systems. In
the former case, the property is formulated in terms of the ratio of two species,
whereas in the latter case, the property concerns the ratio of (equally many)
predator and prey species. Thus, the generalization approach can be difficult
to carry out, if the robust property is not the same in all cases and needs to be
reformulated.
In the case of the models examined in Weisberg (2006b), which served as the
starting point of the generalization approach, we find that the robust property
in question, the Volterra Property, is the same formal statement in all cases.
This is not an assumption that is generally made in robustness analysis. Gener-
ally, a robust property can be characterized informally, and the statements are
only required to be similar, or “biologically the same”. A second commonality of
the models examined in Weisberg (2006b) is that the derivations of the Volterra
Property, while different, are similar. I suggest that in this kind of situation,
the generalization approach should be applied as a rule of thumb: if a series of
models, formulated in the same mathematical framework, yields identical for-
mulations of a robust property, and the derivations proceed in a similar manner,
we should try to identify one general model from which we can derive the ro-
bust property. In this kind of situation, robustness analysis serves as a heuristic
strategy: the point of deriving the same result from a range of different models
serves the ultimate goal of finding a general result, by examining some instances
first.
So far, we have seen that the generalization approach deviates from the usual
steps of robustness analysis, in that it results in one general model instead of
multiple, independent models. We have also identified conditions under which
the generalization approach may be applicable. I will now turn to the question
as to whether robustness analysis and the generalization approach are compat-
ible. The goal of robustness analysis is to solve the following problem: if we
use an idealized model, such as the original Lotka-Volterra model, to derive a
regularity, such as the Volterra Principle, we do not know whether this result
applies to the target system, or whether it is a mere artifact of the idealizations
of the model. The solution is to establish the Volterra Principle for multiple,
independent models, to make sure that the result is independent of the ideal-
izations of the original model. The goal of the generalization approach is the
same, namely to show that a result, such as the Volterra Principle, does not
depend on the idealizations of a particular model. However, the generalization
approach shows that the idealizations of the original model are not necessary;
weaker assumptions suffice to derive the same result. Note that generalization
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does not get rid of all idealizations. The generalization of a result is only as good
as the idealizations used in the general model. The two approaches, then, share
the goal of controlling for idealizations, but they achieve this goal in different
ways: the generalization approach uses one, general model, while robustness
analysis uses multiple, independent models to control for idealizations.
7 The Generalized Volterra Principle as an Ex-
planation
The Volterra Principle was originally proposed as an explanation of an empirical
regularity, as I pointed out in section 2 above. It is, therefore, natural to ask
whether the results in section 4 are explanatorily significant. I discuss this
issue in the present section. I show that the results in section 4 exhibit several
explanatory virtues that have been proposed in the debate on mathematical
explanations.
Before I discuss the explanatory virtues, some clarifications are in order.
The original explanandum is an empirical regularity observed in fishery statis-
tics. These findings have been disputed on empirical and statistical grounds,
e.g. by E.S. Pearson (1927). Of course, the facticity of the explanandum is nec-
essary if we want to give a real explanation.23 Here I do not discuss empirical
questions, but I rather assume that we are dealing with an actual, empirical
phenomenon. I then assess the theoretical virtues of the results in section 4
under this assumption. The explanation I discuss is that the Volterra Property
in Gause-type models is explained by the fact that the growth rate function f
is decreasing, whilst the functional response p is increasing.
One of the explanatory virtues of the above results consists in their gener-
ality, or unificatory power, and we can spell this out in terms of unification, as
proposed by Philip Kitcher (1989): if we compare Weisberg’s results with those
given here, we see that the explanation I propose is more unified, and that it
subsumes different, but similar, arguments given by Weisberg, under one argu-
ment scheme, in a natural way. Now, it has been argued in the literature on
mathematical explanations that unification, and generality, cannot be all there
is to mathematical explanation.24 I agree that while generality and unification
do contribute to explanatory power, they are not all there is to it.
A second explanatory virtue of the results in section 4 is that the results
establish natural boundaries for the validity of the Volterra Principle.25 I showed
that the Volterra Principle is not valid if the assumptions on the functions f and
23Additionally, one should always compare the mechanism producing the empirical phe-
nomenon with the model used in the explanation, in order to assess the explanation’s ade-
quacy.
24See Hafner and Mancosu (2008) for a critical discussion of unification à la Kitcher in the
context of mathematical explanation, and Steiner (1978) for arguments against a characteri-
zation of explanatory power in terms of generality.
25The importance of establishing the limits of a result to robustness analysis has been made
by Wimsatt (2012b) [1981].
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p are weakened any further. These properties are minimal, in that if the growth
rate f increases, the explanandum does not follow; similarly, the equilibrium
may become unstable, if the functional response p decreases. These properties
are not only sufficient, but also necessary, for the Volterra Principle, against
the background of Gause-type models. This fits nicely with a recent proposal
by Christopher Pincock (2014), who requires conditions that are necessary as
well as sufficient for “abstract explanations”; a kind of mathematical explanation.
Pincock’s idea is that requiring the condition to be necessary as well as sufficient
makes sure that there are no redundant assumptions in the explanans, in that
if the assumptions are weakened, the explanation fails. This is exactly what we
see here.
A third explanatory virtue of the Gause-type explanation emerges, if we an-
alyze its relation to the other, less general explanations. Volterra’s explanation,
based on the original predator-prey model, establishes that it is possible to ac-
count for the Volterra Property, on the basis of systems of coupled differential
equations. Weisberg showed that Volterra’s result can be extended to other,
more realistic models. This establishes that the explanation is not an artifact
of the idealizations of the original predator-prey model. What the explanation
based on the Gause-type model achieves is the identification of the properties
that are ultimately responsible for the explanandum, viz. the (mathematical)
Volterra Property. By doing this, the Gause-type explanation not only accounts
for the explanandum, but it also explains why the other explanations, proposed
by Volterra and Weisberg respectively, worked in the first place: the growth
function and the functional response of all these explanations have the right
properties. The idea that explanatory relations of this kind, between differ-
ent explanations, can be interpreted as an explanatory virtue has recently been
proposed by Marc Lange (2014). According to Lange, a mathematical result
that answers questions that other results leave open is “deep”, and has high
explanatory power. This is a further important feature of the results presented
here.
In sum, the results regarding the Volterra Principle presented above, have
several explanatory virtues. They are general, they provide an explanans that is
sufficient and necessary in the case of Gause-type models, and they are “deep”,
in explaining why previous explanations worked.
8 Robustness Analysis and Coincidence
The generalized Volterra Principle unifies multiple, apparently independent,
models using the Gause-type model. This general model explains the Volterra
Property, and it also explains why we succeeded in deriving the Volterra Prop-
erty from the other, apparently independent, models. While it is desirable to
apply the generalization approach in other cases as well, there is no guaran-
tee that it will always work. What if the generalization approach yields no
result? In the present section, I address this question. I will argue that in cases
in which generalization cannot be applied, robustness analysis and explanation
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pull in different directions. I will restrict attention to cases where generalization
is a promising approach in principle, i.e., cases where the same mathematical
statement is derived from multiple, independent models within the same math-
ematical framework.
Consider, for a moment, the reasoning process of a theorist who wants to
establish the robustness of a property, such as the Volterra Property. The
theorist examines a range of different models within the same mathematical
framework, and succeeds in deriving the same property from different models.
In this situation, the theorist can be confident that the property is in fact
robust. However, the theorist will not stop there. She will also wonder whether
the fact that she succeeded in deriving the result in such a way has a common
explanation. In fact, there is a certain urgency to find such an explanation,
because this would account for the fact that multiple derivations are possible.
If, on the other hand, no such explanation is to be had – what does this tell us?
It may tell us that the existence of multiple derivations is a mere coincidence.
It could be questioned whether mathematical coincidences are possible at all,
given that all mathematical truths are necessary. At the very least, the notion
of a mathematical coincidence needs to be clarified. The notion of mathematical
coincidence has been discussed by Marc Lange (2010). Lange gives the following
example of a mathematical coincidence: The thirteenth digit of the decimal
expansion of both e and pi is 9. There is no reason, or common explanation, for
this fact; at least, no such explanation is known. It is a mere coincidence. In a
nutshell, Lange’s account of mathematical coincidence is that two mathematical
facts F and G are coincidences, if there is no common mathematical explanation
of F and G. If we want this definition to be non-trivial, we have to make some
requirements on the “naturalness” that a common mathematical explanation
would have to satisfy; otherwise, a mere conjunction of any two explanations
would be sufficient. One of the main challenges is to spell out just what such
a requirement of “naturalness” amounts to. I will not discuss this issue in the
abstract, but I will rather turn to the case at hand instead.
Lange’s idea applies to the case of the Volterra Principle, as follows. The
mathematical coincidence is that we can derive the Volterra Property from the
original predator-prey model, as well as from both the model with density de-
pendence, and the model with predator satiation; all of this was established
in Weisberg (2006b). This situation, the (apparent) coincidence, prompts the
request for an explanation. The explanation is provided in section 4 above:
the different models are special cases of the Gause-type model, from which the
Volterra Property can be derived.26 Thus, in some cases, the process of robust-
ness analysis can itself prompt a request for an explanation, and in a subset of
these cases – including the generalized Volterra Principle – an explanation can
be provided, and the apparent coincidence is explained away.
What about real coincidences? In these cases, we succeed in deriving the
26I am not suggesting here that all mathematical explanations have the form of general-
izations, or unification; I merely claim that the results in section 4 do in fact explain the
(apparent) coincidence in Weisberg (2006b), viz. that the Volterra Property can be derived
from multiple models.
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same property from multiple models, but there is no common explanation of
the fact that these multiple derivations were possible. This fact is a mere co-
incidence. In this case, the following situation arises. Assume that we want
to check whether some idealizations in a model M are responsible for the ex-
planation of a property P , or whether the explanation is independent of these
idealizations. According to Schupbach (2016), we can do this using robustness
analysis. Assume, further, that: we construct two models, M1 and M2, that;
in these two models, different idealizations from M are removed, and that; we
succeed in deriving the property P from M1 and M2. Assume, finally, that this
is a mathematical coincidence. This means that there is no explanation as to
why we succeeded in deriving the property P from M1 and M2. If this is the
case, we will not be able to construct a model M ′ which encompasses M1 and
M2, and from which we can derive P , insofar as such a derivation constitutes an
explanation telling us why the multiple, independent derivations are possible.
This, in turn, means that the different idealizations in M , which were removed
in M1 and M2 individually, cannot be removed collectively by constructing one
model M ′, such that M ′ would explain P . This is worrisome because having
at least one of the idealizations seems to be essential to the derivation of the
property P : it is impossible to remove all the idealizations in the two models
at the same time by constructing an explanatory model. Note that the ex-
planatory goal of robustness analysis, according to Schupbach’s proposal, can
still be achieved to a certain degree. We can control for some idealizations in
a model, by deriving a property from different models, thus ruling out these
idealizations as explanations. However, some idealization cannot be removed
from our explanation.
In sum, it has to be expected that generalization will not work in all cases.
The interpretation of such cases as mathematical coincidences has interesting
consequences, in particular the impossibility of finding a general, explanatory
model that removes all idealizations we would like to control for. This does not
mean that generalization, or mathematical coincidences, speak against robust-
ness analysis. Rather, we should interpret robustness analysis as a heuristic
strategy that can lead to several possible outcomes. On the one hand, we may
discover a general model that provides a unified explanation of a mathematical
fact. On the other hand, however, we may find a mathematical fact that can be
derived from several, independent models is merely an example of a mathemat-
ical coincidence. In the latter case, the outcome of robustness analysis is that
an explanation is not to be had, and that some idealizations are here to stay.
9 Conclusion
In the present paper, I have shown that the Volterra Principle can be gener-
alized for Gause-type models, extending results by Weisberg and Reisman. I
have argued that this generalization has some of the virtues of mathematical
explanations; in particular, the limits of the results establish necessary and suf-
ficient conditions, and the results illuminate previous explanations. I have also
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proposed that cases in which the generalization approach is not applicable can
be interpreted as mathematical coincidences.
The present paper reveals a close connection between the goals of robustness
analysis and those of purely mathematical work on theoretical models. General-
izing existing results is a very common practice in mathematics. However, there
are other aspects of mathematics that should also be explored in the context of
robustness analysis. First, more should be said about cases of representational
robustness, where the robust results stem from different mathematical frame-
works. These are cases of analogical reasoning in mathematics, the status of
which is all but clear. Second, more complicated cases of structural robustness
have scarcely been discussed so far. For example, a systematic study of “analog-
ical generalizations”, such as Volterra’s generalizations of the Volterra Principle
to n-species systems, would be worthwhile. Third, the results in the present
paper could also be further generalized to other kinds of predator-prey models.
A Models with Density Dependence and Preda-
tor Satiation
After normalizing parameters a and b, the model with density dependent prey
(Weisberg, 2006b, equations (6)-(7)) can be written as
x˙ = xr
(
1− x
K
)− xy (12)
y˙ = xy −my (13)
In this model, the first summand in equation (1) is modified such that the
prey population does not grow indefinitely in the absence of predators, but
rather the growth is limited by a maximal number of prey, the carrying capacity
K. This model can be seen to be of Gause-type by letting f(x) = 1 − xK and
p(x) = x.
The model with predator satiation (Weisberg, 2006b, equations (9)-(10)),
after normalizing parameters a, b and c, can be written as
x˙ = xr
(
1− x
K
)− (1− e−x)y (14)
y˙ = (1− e−x)y −my (15)
This model takes into account that the rate at which predators capture prey
may not be constant, as in the Lotka-Volterra model, but may rather decrease
with increasing prey density. This model can be seen to be of Gause-type, by
choosing f(x) = 1− xK and p(x) = 1− e−x.
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